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Abstract
An example of supply chain coordination is early order
commitment, wherein a retailer commits to purchase a
fixed-order quantity and delivery time from a
manufacturer before the real need takes place. In this paper,
an analytical model is developed that quantifies the impact
of early order commitment on the performance of a simple
two-level supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer
and a single retailer. The model reveals that the effect of
early order commitment depends on a lot of factors such as
the cost structure of the supply chain, the lengths of
manufacturing and delivery lead times, and the correlation
of the demand over time. This model can be used to
evaluate the benefit of early order commitment, to
determine the optimal early commitment periods of the
supply chain, and to estimate the maximum incentives the
manufacturer can provide to encourage the retailer to
commit its orders in advance.
Keywords: Supply Chain Coordination, Early Order
Commitment, Inventory Control

1. Introduction
Effective supply chain management requires
coordination among the various members in a supply chain.
Through coordinating activities across the boundaries of
firms in a supply chain, it is believed that significant
benefits can be achieved for the partners and the entire
supply chain. Previous research has recognized different
approaches for supply chain coordination, including
information sharing -- sharing real-time demand data
collected at the point-of-sales with upstream suppliers
([1],[6], [7]). A further-developed method concerning the
effective use of such information suggests a centralized
forecasting mechanism that accesses the final demand ([2],
[3], [8]). These investigations reveal that information
sharing can significantly enhance the performance of the
supply chain by reducing the bullwhip effect, a negative
phenomenon of demand variability amplification along a
supply chain from downstream members to their suppliers.
Recently, as another alternative form of supply chain
coordination, early order commitment has drawn attention
from the researchers and practitioners. Early order

commitment means that a retailer commits to purchase a
fixed-order quantity and delivery time from a
manufacturer before the real need takes place. [5]
presented an analysis for a steel distribution supply chain,
and quantified the benefits for the consumers who commit
orders in advance. [9-11] conducted extensive simulation
studies on the effect of early order commitment on supply
chain performance under various operational conditions.
These researches show that under some cases, practicing
early order commitment can generate significant cost
savings in the supply chain. [4] examined the tradeoff
between strategic early order commitment and
postponement. Generally speaking, the impact of early
order commitment on the supply chain performance is
intuitively clear. On one hand, early order commitment
increases a retailer’s risks of over-estimating the demand;
On the other hand, it helps the manufacturer reduce
planning and executing costs. In order to accept early order
commitment to achieve best performance for the entire
supply chain, the members at different levels of the supply
chain should make optimal tradeoff based on careful
evaluation of both the negative effect for the retailer and
the positive effect for the manufacturer. Unfortunately, up
to now, no general analytical model is available to quantify
the integrated effect of early order commitment and to
guide such kind of tradeoff decisions. Besides, a
fundamental question about early order commitment is
why should a retailer make commitment (with penalty
charge) if information sharing (without cost penalty for
order commitment) can provide equal or close enough
benefits!
This paper aims at proposing an analytical model to
quantify the impact of early order commitment on the
performance of a simple two-level supply chain consisting
of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The model
reveals the effect of early order commitment depends on a
lot of factors such as the cost structure of the supply chain,
the length of manufacturing and delivery lead time, and the
correlation of the demand over time. Furthermore, under
some cases, significant benefit can be achieved for the
supply chain even under the environment with information
sharing. This model can be used to evaluate the benefit of
early order commitment, to determine the optimal early
commitment periods of the supply chain, and to estimate
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the maximum incentives the manufacturer can provide to
encourage the retailer to commit its orders in advance.

2. Supply Chain Model
2.1 Basic Assumptions
The basic assumptions underlying the model in this
paper is similar to the one proposed by LST. The supply
chain is assumed to be a simple one consists of a single
manufacturer and a single retailer. Only the retailer faces
external demand for a single product, and the demand is
assumed to be a simple autocorrelated AR(1) process, i.e.,
the demand in period t is

Dt = d + ρDt −1 + ε t ,

(1)

ε t is i.i.d. normally distributed
2
with mean zero and variance σ . We also assume that σ
where d>0, -1< ρ <1, and

is significantly smaller than d, so that the probability of
negative demand is negligible. Furthermore, the demand
process and its characteristic parameters are common
knowledge, i.e., both the retailer and the manufacturer
know the demand distribution in (1) and the values of the
parameters d, ρ , and σ . LST gave some evidences to
show that the assumption of AR(1) demand process with
known characteristic parameters is reasonable in real
world supply chain management when demand
information is shared from the retailer to the supplier.
The manufacturing leadtime for the manufacturer
(including the leadtime for the replenishment of raw
materials from the external suppliers) is a constant L, and
the delivery leadtime from the manufacuturer to the
retailer is a constant l. The most important feature of the
current paper is that we incorporate an early order
commitment period (A) to the system. Early order
commitment period is the number of the time periods that
the retailer places her order in advance.
Both the retailer and the manufacturer use the
order-up-to policy, a periodic reviewing policy which is
optimal for the stochastic inventory system without fixed
ordering cost, to make their ordering (or manufacturing)
decisions with the review interval being one period (i.e.,
daily review). The events occur in sequence as follows.
Before the end of period t, after demand Dt has been
realized, the retailer places her order of size Ot based on
her inventory level. Please note that, because of the early
order commitment, this order is scheduled for the period
t+l+A+1, not for the period t+l+1. That’s to say, because of
the early order commitment period A and delivery leadtime
l, this order will arrive the retailer at the beginning of
period t+l+A+1. If the retailer does not hold enough stock
to satisfy the demand, the excess demand is backordered.
When the manufacturer receives this order from the
retailer, she does not need to ship the order Ot to the
retailer immediately. In fact, the quantity the manufacturer
must ship to the retailer is the order placed by the retailer A
periods ago, i.e. the order of size Ot-A. We assume that this
order must always be completely filled by the
manufacturer. This means that if the manufacturer does not

hold enough stock to fill the order, she can obtain any
quantity of the product from an external source with a
penalty cost, where the same quantity of the product must
be provided by the manufacturer to resupply the external
source later. Finally, the manufacturer places his
manufacturing order of size Qt based on his inventory level.
This order will arrive at the beginning of period t+L+1.

2.2 Retailer’s Ordering Decision
Let St be the retailer’s order-up-to level in period t,
minimizing the total expected holding and shortage costs
in period t+l+A+1. Comparing our case with the case in
LST, we found that the only difference is that in LST’s case,
the retailer’s order must cover the demand uncertainty up
to t+l+1, while in our case the retailer’s order must cover
more periods’ demand uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty up
to t+l+A+1. In fact, if we take the value l+A as the leadtime
periods, then all the behavior of the retailer will be the
same as in LST.
Denote Xt as the total demand during periods [t+1,
t+l+A+1], then using (1) we have
Xt =
=
+

l + A +1

∑D
j =1

t+ j


1  l + A +1
j
l + A +1
) Dt 
d ∑ (1 − ρ ) + ρ (1 − ρ
1 − ρ  j =1

l + A +1 l + A − j +1

∑ ∑ρ ε
i

j =1

i =0

t+ j

(2)

From (2), Xt is a normal distributed variable with the
mean value
l + A+1

d 
j
mt = E ( X t ) =
(l + A + 1) − ∑ ρ 
1− ρ 
j =1

+

ρ (1 − ρ l + A+1 )
Dt
1− ρ

(3)

and the variance

vt = Var ( X t ) =

σ 2 l + A +1
∑ (1 − ρ j )2 .
(1 − ρ ) 2 j =1

Thus the order-up-to level
St = mt + k vt ,

(4)

(5)

where k is the safety stock factor depending on the unit
holding cost h and unit shortage penalty cost p. In fact, if
Φ is the standard normal distribution function, then

k = Φ −1 ( h +p p ).

(6)

Therefore the retailer’s order quantity at period t is
Ot = Dt + ( S t − S t −1 )

= Dt +

ρ (1 − ρ l + A+1 )
( Dt − Dt −1 ).
1− ρ

( 7)

2.3 Manufacturer’s Ordering Decision
Throughout this paper, we assume that the early order
commitment period A is no more than the manufacturing
leadtime L, i.e., 0 ≤ A ≤ L , since committing the orders
even earlier is harmful to the retailer and not beneficial to

the manufacturer. Please note that A=0 corresponds to the
case that the supplier does not commit orders to the
manufacturer in advance. As we have pointed out in
Section 2.1, the quantity the manufacturer must ship to the
retailer in period t is the order placed by the retailer A
periods ago, i.e. the order of size Ot-A. From (1) and (7), we
have

Ot +1 = d + ρOt +

1 − ρ l + A+ 2
ρ (1 − ρ l + A+1 )
ε t +1 −
ε t . (8)
1− ρ
1− ρ

Repeating to use (8) gives

Ot + i

i −1

k =1

ρ i (1 − ρ l + A +1 )
εt .
1− ρ

(9)

Denote Yt as the total orders that must ship by the
manufacturer during periods [t+1, t+L+1], then
L +1

A

Yt = ∑ Ot − A + j = ∑ Ot − A+ j +
j =1
A

= ∑ Ot − A + j
j =1

+

j =1

L − A +1

∑O
j =1

t+ j

ρ (1 − ρ L − A +1 ) 
d 
+
( L − A + 1) −

1− ρ 
1− ρ


L+l +3− j 2

) .

(12)

j =1

Thus the order-up-to level
(13)

where K is the safety stock factor depending on the unit
holding cost H and unit shortage penalty cost P. In fact, if
Φ is the standard normal distribution function, then

K = Φ −1 ( H P+ P ).

(14)
Therefore the manufacturer’s order quantity at period t
is

3. Supply Chain Performance

3.1 Supply Chain Cost
According to LST (2000), the retailer’s and
manufacturer’s expected inventory holding and shortage
costs in a period can be expressed, respectively, as

c = vt [(h + p ) F (k ) + hk ],

(16)

C = Vt [( H + P) F ( K ) + HK ],

(17)

(18)

x

ρ (1 − ρ L− A+1 )
ρ (1 − ρ L− A+1 )(1 − ρ l + A+1 )
Ot −
εt .
+
1− ρ
(1 − ρ ) 2
(11)
and the variance

Tt = M t + K Vt ,

(15)

∞

ρ (1 − ρ L − A +1 )(1 − ρ l + A +1 )
εt .
(10)
(1 − ρ ) 2
Let Tt be the manufacturer’s order-up-to level at the end
of period t. We assume that the retailer shares her demand
information to the manufacturer, thus the manufacturer
knows both the retailer’s order quantity Ot and demand
error εt up to period t. Raghunathan (2001) showed that the
cases with information sharing and without information
sharing do not make a great difference.
From (10), Yt is a normal distributed variable with the
mean value
A
ρ (1 − ρ L− A+1 ) 
d 
M t = E (Y )t = ∑ Ot − A+ j +
( L − A + 1) −

1− ρ 
1− ρ
j =1


∑ (1 − ρ

ρ (1 − ρ L − A+1 )(1 − ρ l + A+1 )
(ε t − ε t −1 ).
(1 − ρ ) 2

−

F ( x) = ∫ ( z − x)dΦ( z ).

−

L − A+1

ρ (1 − ρ L − A+1 )
(Ot − Ot −1 )
1− ρ

where F(•) is the right loss function for the standard
normal distribution, i.e.,

ρ (1 − ρ L − A +1 )
1 L − A+1
Ot +
∑ (1 − ρ L +l + 3− j )ε t + j
1− ρ
1 − ρ j =1

σ2
Vt = Var (Yt ) =
(1 − ρ ) 2

= Ot +

In this section we evaluate the performance of the
supply chain in terms of inventory holding and shortage
cost.

1− ρi
1 − ρ l + A+ 2
=
d + ρ iOt +
ε t +i
1− ρ
1− ρ
+ ∑ ρ l + A +1+ k ε t + i − k −

Qt = Ot + (Tt − Tt −1 )

Thus the percentage of the retailer’s cost increasing in a
period due to early order commitment is

∆c = ( vt − vt | A = 0 ) / vt | A= 0 = vt / vt | A = 0 − 1
=

l + A +1

l +1

∑ (1 − ρ j )2

∑ (1 − ρ

j =1

j =1

l + A +1

∑ (1 − ρ

= 1+

) −1

j 2

l +1

j 2

)

j =l + 2

∑ (1 − ρ

) −1

j 2

j =1

(19)
and the percentage of the manufacturer’s cost saving in a
period due to early order commitment is

∆C = ( Vt | A= 0 − Vt ) / Vt | A = 0 = 1 − Vt / Vt | A = 0
= 1−

L − A +1

∑ (1 − ρ

L +1

∑ (1 − ρ

L +l + 3− j 2

)

j =1

= 1− 1−

L +1

∑ (1 − ρ

j = L − A+ 2

L + l + 3− j 2

)

j =1

L + l + 3− j 2

)

L +1

∑ (1 − ρ

L +l + 3− j 2

)

i =1

(20)
According to (16) and (17), the total cost of the supply
chain is

SC = c + C

= vt [(h + p) F (k ) + hk ] + Vt [( H + P) F ( K ) + HK ].
(21)
In order to simplify the expression, we introduce a cost
structure ratio (r) to represent the cost structure of the
supply chain. Specifically, we define

r = [(h + p ) F ( k ) + hk ] /[( H + P ) F ( K ) + HK ].

(22)

Then the percentage of the entire supply chain’s cost
saving in a period due to early order commitment is

∆SC = [(c + C ) | A= 0 −(c + C )] /(c + C ) | A = 0
r vt + Vt

=1−

(r vt + Vt ) | A = 0
l + A +1

∑ (1 − ρ

r

) +

j 2

j =1

=1−

l +1

r

∑ (1 − ρ

L − A +1

∑ (1 − ρ

L + l + 3− j 2

)

j =1

) +

j 2

j =1

.

L +1

∑ (1 − ρ

L + l + 3− j 2

)

j =1

3.2 Performance of Early Order Commitment
In this Subsection, we fix the parameters r=1, L=l=10,
ρ=0.5, and vary A from 0 to L and calculate the
corresponding relative cost increase or decrease for the
retailer, the manufacturer, and the whole supply chain
according to (19), (20) and (23). The corresponding
relative cost increase or decrease are plotted in Figure 1.
From this example, we can see that the earlier the retailer
commit orders with the manufacturer, the more benefits
can be achieved for the total supply chain. When A reaches
the largest value (10 periods), the retailer’s cost is
increased by 43.92%, the manufacturer’s cost is reduced
by 69.85%, and the whole supply chain’s cost is reduced
by 15.30%.

(23)
Obviously, ∆c > 0 and ∆C > 0 are both increasing
function with respect to the early order commitment period
A. Formula (19) shows that the retailer’s relative cost
increase due to early order commitment depends on the
correlation of the demand process, the delivery leadtime
from the manufacturer to the retailer, and the early order
commitment period. Besides these three factors, formula
(20) shows that another factor, the manufacturer’s
replenishment leadtime, affects the manufacturer’s relative
cost saving. Furthermore, formula (23) shows that the cost
structure ratio also affects the integrated performance of
the whole supply chain due to early order commitment.
However, these results reveal that although the variance of
the error item in the demand process (1) amplifies the
absolute values for the costs, it does not have any impact
on the relative cost increase or decrease for the retailer, the
manufacturer, and the whole supply chain, unless there is
no demand uncertainty (i.e., the variance of the error item
is zero).
From (23), we can easily obtain the following
condition where the early order commitment is beneficial
to the whole supply chain: ∆SC > 0, or equivalently


r


<

l + A +1

∑ (1 − ρ

j

)2 −

j =1

L +1

∑ (1 − ρ
j =1

L + l + 3− j

l +1

∑ (1 − ρ
j =1

)2 −

L − A +1

j


)2 



∑ (1 − ρ

L + l + 3− j

)2 .

j =1

(24)
This is the critical condition that guides us to determine
whether we should use the early order commitment or not
in a supply chain. The smaller the cost structure ratio r, the
more that early order commitment can benefit the whole
supply chain.
In order to get more insights about the interaction
between early order commitment and the parameters of the
supply chain, we conduct some numerical results in the
following Subsections.
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Figure 1. Performance of early order commitment period
(r=1, L=l=10, ρ=0.5)

3.3 Impact of Demand Process Characteristics
In this Subsection, we first fix the parameters r=1,
L=l=10 and vary ρ from –0.9 to +0.9 with increment 0.1.
For each value of ρ, we vary A from 0 to L and calculate the
corresponding relative cost increase or decrease for the
retailer, the manufacturer, and the whole supply chain
according to (19), (20) and (23). Then the value of A that
results in the largest cost saving for the whole supply chain
according to (23) is recorded as A*, the optimal early order
commitment period. We find that the optimal value of A*
=L=10 periods under all the values of ρ for this setting. The
corresponding relative cost increase or decrease are
plotted in Figure 2. From the figure, we can see that the
retailer’s cost increases quickly as ρ increases to 0.5 or
above. However, it shows that the cost savings for the
manufacturer and the whole supply chain is about 70% and
15% respectively, and the results are relatively stable
under different values of ρ.
However, there are interactions between A, ρ and the
leadtimes L, l. Figure 3 represents the results for fixed
parameters r=1, L=10, l=3. Similarly, we vary ρ from –0.9
to +0.9 with increment 0.1, and for each value of ρ, we
vary A from 0 to L to find A*, the optimal early order
commitment period. We find that the optimal value of A*
equals ten periods (A=L=10) when ρ is not over 0.7, and A*

100

Percentage of Cost Increase (or Decrease)

90
80

Manufacturer

180
160
Percentage of Cost Increase (or Decrease)

=0 periods when ρ is larger than 0.8. From the figure, we
can see that the retailer’s cost increase due to early order
commitment climbs to extremely higher value as ρ
increases, and finally exceeds the cost savings of the
manufacturer. Under the cases where ρ is smaller than 0.5,
the cost savings of the manufacturer and of the whole
supply chain are about 70% and 10%, respectively.
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Figure 4. The impact of Delivery Leadtime
(r=1, ρ=0.5, L=10)

Retailer

40
30
Supply Chain

20

100

10

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1
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(r=1, L=l=10)
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3.4 Impact of Leadtimes
In this Subsection, we first fix the parameters r=1,
ρ=0.5, L=10 and vary l from 0 to 20. For each value of l,
we vary A from 0 to L to find A*, the optimal early order
commitment period. We find that A* =L=10 periods when l
is greater than or equals to 2, and A* =0 when l is very small
(0 or 1). The corresponding relative cost increase or cost
decrease is plotted in Figure 4.
Now we fix the parameters r=1, ρ=0.5, l=10 and vary L
from 0 to 20. For each value of L, we vary A from 0 to L to
find A*, the optimal early order commitment period. We
find that A* =L periods for all values of L. The
corresponding relative cost increase or cost decrease is
plotted in Figure 5.
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Figure 6. The impact of Cost Structure Ratio
(ρ=0.5, L=l=10)

3.5 Impact of Cost Structures Ratio
In this Subsection, we fix the parameters ρ=0.5, L= l
=10 and vary r from 0.5 to 2.0 with increment 0.1. For each
value of r, we vary A from 0 to L to find A*, the optimal

early order commitment period. We find that A* =L=10
periods when r is smaller than or equals to 1.7, and A* =0
when r is relatively loarge (over 1.8). The corresponding
relative cost increase or decrease are plotted in Figure 6.
Obviously, the cost savings decrease as r increases.

4. Conclusions
In this paper, an analytical model is developed that
quantifies the impact of early order commitment on the
performance of a simple two-level supply chain consisting
of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The model
reveals that the effect of early order commitment depends
on some key factors such as the cost structure of the supply
chain, the lengths of manufacturing and delivery lead times,
and the correlation of the demand over time. This model
can be used to evaluate the benefit of early order
commitment, to determine the optimal early commitment
periods of the supply chain, and to estimate the maximum
incentives the manufacturer can provide to encourage the
retailer to commit its orders in advance.
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